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I can think of few activities more enervating emotionally than 
to survey the psychological literature on sex differences. I first did 
so about 15 years ago, soon after the birth of contemporary Ameri-
can feminism, and was taken aback by the gap between the actual, 
enfeebled state of our knowledge, and the dogmatic self-assertion of 
so much then being written on the topic. 
Since that time, things both have and have not changed. What 
has changed is the sheer quantity of work done or in progress, a 
dearth having become a glut; what has not changed is our depth of 
understanding. The abundance of new data has produced no break-
throughs, no new insights, and few bases for changes of heart or 
mind. If you believed fifteen years ago that sex differences, the im-
portant ones, were at bottom biological in origin, you would have 
no compelling reason to believe otherwise today. If you were a doc-
trinaire environmentalist then, you would still be so today. In 
either case, you could muster far more support for your position 
than previously, as in fact you could for all positions between the 
extremes. So one major reason to be dispirited is the strong sense 
one gets of a discipline merely treading water-it is depressing to 
read through dozens of laborious articles reporting minor variations 
on this or that empirical theme, to find that in the end they add up 
to little in the way of enhanced understanding. 
To some considerable degree, these problems reflect a larger set 
of problems we find in social science generally: given a complex 
topic, it is extraordinarily difficult to obtain secure, non-trivial find-
ings, and to articulate compelling or even heuristic theoretical mod-
els. The optimism we once had about the powers of social science, 
our belief that it would soon clarify and help resolve a wide range of 
social and psychological troubles-that optimism, so strongly felt in 
the 1950's and 1960's, now seems heady if not utopian. 
Yet these generic problems are compounded, within the do-
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main of sex differences research, by the tendentious intentions of so 
many investigators. It is not merely that so many seem drawn to 
the topic because of an overweening personal interest; beyond that, 
we see a steady erosion of that necessary line between scientific dis-
interestedness and ideological purpose. It is not true in all cases, 
perhaps not even in most; but it is common enough to force a wari-
ness upon the reader who can no longer assume that some tainting 
or tilting either of facts or interpretation, whether witting or unwit-
ting, is an event either rare or guarded against. Indeed, some schol-
ars in this area have become quite open about their intentions, 
proclaiming that their aim is to support their "values" through the 
medium of research. Many others are not quite so bold publicly, 
but will talk freely in private about what they expect their findings 
to demonstrate, and how it will lead to the betterment of human-
kind. Still others take to wearing two hats, playing the role of the 
objective scientist part of the time, and that of the activist while 
speaking to the press or in public appearances. In all of these in-
stances we find a touching faith in the power of the scientific 
method to help keep one's partisan passions at bay, a faith often 
misplaced. Yet in some cases, as we will see later, the belief in the 
scientific method itself has waned, there being the view that science 
is masculinist, thereby keeping us from larger and truer truths. 
One would like to believe that so far not too much has been 
lost. The more carefully refereed journals, like Psychology Bulletin, 
are unlikely to print egregiously biased articles, and those journals 
remain the most prestigious. That is indeed comfort, but rather 
smaller than it may appear, since only a fraction of the total range 
of research is subjected to close scrutiny. Futhermore, neither trade 
nor textbooks are carefully refereed, from the point of view of schol-
arly balance, and these tend to receive favorable attention in both 
the scholarly and general press, as long as they follow current fash-
ion. Still futher, those books tend to be selected for use in college-
level courses in women's studies, many of which are exercises in 
political indoctrination. Thus we find texts which seem given over 
monotonously to complaints or rationalizations, all differences be-
tween the sexes, including those seemingly favorable to women, 
seen as connected to discrimination or to invidious forms of child-
rearing. In one recent text, for example, the male advantage in spa-
tial perception is seen as an outcome of girls' being dissuaded from 
participation in sports, whereas the female advantage in verbal abil-
ity evokes the comment that despite this advantage, women are not 
allowed to use these gifts to the fullest. 
The problem of bias has been exacerbated by the dubious posi-
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tions taken by some of the scholarly associations, now given over to 
the propagation of liberal or leftist political causes. Much of the 
American Orthopsychiatric Association's annual program is de-
voted to agit-prop; issues on the feminist agenda are not given ob-
jective discussion. That division of the American Psychological 
Association presumably devoted to the study of feminine psychol-
ogy has shown a quick and unseemly devolution from the sponsor-
ship of research to the promotion of feminist causes, including some 
which do not, logically speaking, have much to do with feminism 
per se, such as the support of both male and female homosexuality. 
The sad fact is that it has become nearly impossible to tell the differ-
ence between a scholarly meeting and a political caucus, and what is 
worse, there seem to be few within the societies willing to complain, 
or even call attention to what would have been deemed, just a few 
years ago, a scandalous situation. 
Hence, much of social science scholarship, rather than helping 
to solve these inherently difficult questions, participates in or con-
tributes to the irresponsibility with which these issues are discussed 
in public discourse. A certain frivolousness in dealing even with 
simple facts is now so commonplace as to be nearly normative. 
Consider the straightforward question of differences in earnings be-
tween the sexes. One hears a great many assertions made on this 
matter, nearly all false or misleading. A moment's thought leads us 
to the understanding that wage differences are due to the fact that 
the two sexes usually do not do the same work or have the same 
history of continuity or seniority in the job, two factors being the 
major determinants of wages in the marketplace. Yet these facts 
have not prevented feminists from pointing to the "59 percent wage 
gap" as evidence of discrimination in the market, despite the fact 
that this statistic is based on gross comparisons between male and 
female incomes. 
This essay concerns itself not with wage rates or labor econom-
ics, but with psychological sex differences, questions having to do 
with variations in ability, emotions, drives, personal traits, and the 
like. The reason I mention differential earnings is to provide a fore-
taste of the problems lying in wait. Money is one of the simplest 
variables we can imagine-it is tangible, quantifiable, morally neu-
tral, and universally understood. The literature on sex differences 
typically deals with variables extraordinarily complex and elusive-
such qualities as aggressiveness or dependency or moral outlook. 
Such qualities are intangible, difficult to quantify, morally contro-
versial or ambigous, and the source of considerable confusion and 
disagreement. In this area, questions which initially seem to be en-
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tirely straightforward soon tum out to be maddeningly tortuous, 
and teeming with nearly insoluble problems of measurement and 
interpretation. Consider whether men are more aggressive than wo-
men. One would certainly think so, on the basis of common obser-
vation, or such indices as the statistics on assault and disorderly 
conduct, or preferences in spectator sport. Yet when we approach 
the question analytically, matters do not seem at all straightfor-
ward. What do we mean by aggression? Do we mean physical vio-
lence or verbal abuse? Do we mean violence alone or such qualities 
as competitiveness or assertiveness? And how do you measure 
them? These questions or others like them have come to dominate 
the literature on sex differences and aggressiveness, which has fur-
ther evolved into a group of sub-literatures exploring and arguing 
about fairly narrow matters of research design and the like. 
That is the inevitable evolution in all areas of research, and 
should not distress us. Yet one senses that on this topic the evolu-
tion is being guided not so much by a more-or-less disinterested 
wish to clarify the issues as by the wish to substitute a new set of 
stereotypes for the ones we already have in place. What we now 
find in the literature influenced by feminist doctrine is that aggres-
siveness-as-violence is thought to be a masculine quality, whereas 
aggressiveness-by-assertiveness is thought not to be differentiated by 
sex. One can make a plausible case for that construction; but then 
one can make equally plausible cases for a number of entirely differ-
ent constructions. The state of the literature, here as elsewhere, is 
so jumbled as to allow the findings to be arranged and interpreted 
almost at will. 
The "gender and aggression" topic is more or less typical, 
neither the worst nor the best example of the problems involved in 
obtaining secure knowledge on difficult topics, and of the com-
pounding of those problems when ideological passions are on the 
loose. It has seemed to me that any survey of the sex differences 
literature, prepared for a general audience, entirely misses the point, 
since an honest report of most topics within the domain would have 
to say something like: "This is the little that we know. The rest is 
speculation or pretense or wishful thinking. You do well to take it 
all with a grain of salt." It seems far more useful to look closely at a 
representative topic, to examine the state of the knowledge, to look 
at the controversies and why they exist, and in general to introduce 
the reader to a necessary skepticism. 
Let us consider a fairly simple question-sex differences in 
mathematical ability-where the dependent variable is relatively 
easy to measure, where the differences between the sexes are well 
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established, and where the major desideratum-an improvement in 
female achievement-is universally accepted. It is also a topic 
where we have had, again relatively speaking, an abundance of re-
search, enough so that the conflicts and disagreements that have 
emerged cannot be written off as a result of our ignorance, as is so 
often the case in the sex differences literature. 
Julian Stanley and Camille Benbow, psychologists at Johns 
Hopkins University, are our leading scholars in the study of mathe-
matical precocity. For some years they have devoted themselves to 
the question of early mathematical achievement-how to recognize 
it, how to cultivate it, and beyond that, the lessons to be learned 
about the origins and nurturance of mathematical and scientific tal-
ent in general. They have been working for nearly fifteen years to 
discover ways of identifying young talent and understanding its 
evolution: academic programs chosen, the effectiveness of accelera-
tion and enrichment courses, the progress through high school, col-
lege, and early career. 
From the beginning the emphasis has been on precocity itself, 
not on gender, but the fact of sex differences has become salient for 
two reasons: (1) it became evident that talented girls were far less 
likely to skip grades or take advanced classes, some indication of an 
absence of drive or encouragement or opportunity; (2) there were 
far fewer girls to be found at the very top in mathematical aptitude. 
Although on the whole boys and girls do not differ by a wide mar-
gin, there are astonishing differences at the highest levels of apti-
tude. In early adolescence, boys are represented ten or twelve times 
more often than girls at the highest levels of the test employed (and 
in the latest figures reported the ratio is 17: 1 ). They feel that this is 
a datum of great social importance, since innovators in science and 
technology are drawn from the ranks of the highly talented, most of 
whom were precocious. For that reason, the modest advantage in 
boys generally may be of less importance socially than the ex-
traordinary differences at the top. They have argued for a concen-
tration on that particular gender gap, given the need to cultivate 
and recruit a scarce supply of the mathematically talented required 
in the generations ahead. 
Benbow and Stanley were in a good position to make this 
point. They were not primarily students of gender, but of educa-
tion; they had done more work on the question of mathematical 
talent than anyone else; and-no small matter-they were female 
and male, and hence were not easily accused of malice or invidious-
ness or sexism. Nevertheless, that accusation was made. Since 
some of the popular media in reporting their findings had raised the 
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possibility of a genetic sex difference, it was argued that if mathe-
matical aptitude were to be widely understood as genetic, it would 
act as a disincentive to girls, to their families, and to schools. Ben-
bow and Stanley replied that first, they had done more to stimulate 
mathematical learning, in both boys and girls, than anyone else; sec-
ond, that they had not themselves raised the issue of a "math gene," 
third, their own view held that a mixture of exogenous and endoge-
nous influences were involved. 
So despite the bitterness between the adversaries, both agree--
indeed, both aver-that there almost certainly is an interaction be-
tween nature and nurture. They also agree that the relative degree 
of influence cannot be measured with any precision, now or in the 
immediate future. They also agree that efforts at remediation could 
make a difference, and ought to be tried. In short, they agree that, 
speaking practically, one must be environmentalist, that is, if one is 
to improve the performance in girls one must concentrate upon "so-
cial reality." And it is at this point that the truly difficult question 
appears, since it soon becomes evident that we have no clear idea 
what comprises that reality. 
There are two major ways in which "environment" might in-
fluence mathematical performance: through socialization, the myr-
iad ways in which the family and other institutions form the total 
personality; and through situation-the pressures, constraints, op-
portunities, and incentives of the here and now. When we look to 
socialization as the key, we must choose among a vast array of pos-
sibilities. Is the clue to be found in cognition-are boys and girls 
perhaps being encouraged to think differently, boys being rewarded 
for logical as against expressive thought, or for playing number 
rather than word games? Might the differences have to do with the 
motivation each sex is permitted-girls, let us say, being forbidden 
competitiveness? The problem may lie in expectations-teachers, 
believing that girls cannot do well in mathematics, communicate 
these expectations to them, thereby inducing a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Or it may be that girls and boys, looking at the occupational 
world they are about to enter, make commitments of effort and am-
bition based on an appraisal of the opportunities. 
One gets a sense of the problem by looking at some of the vari-
ables just mentioned. Think how difficult it is to measure almost 
any aspect of the differential rearing of the sexes. The most eco-
nomical way is some survey or interview of the parents, but that is 
fallible for obvious reasons-false memory, self-deception, the wish 
to say the right thing, and so on. Or one might spend a great deal of 
time, as anthropologists do, in the close and more-or-less constant 
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observation of a small number of families; but the problems there 
have to do with the expense and effort required, and the limited 
samples available. Even so, there would be problems having to do 
with an unbiased assessment of the observations. Or one might 
have occasional meetings with a larger number of families. Which-
ever method we choose, we will be getting only a partial picture, 
since for a full account one would have to study families at different 
social levels, of different sizes, with different structures, and at dif-
ferent ages. Even then, one could not easily make the case that 
socialization, or any particular aspect of it, is genuinely influential 
in the development of a given talent. One might do so, if the results 
were decisively clear; but to my certain knowledge, that has never 
yet been the case in socialization research on any topic. 
Looking at the situation as a source of influence presents its 
own formidable measurement problems. Thus, there has been some 
attempt to directly observe the interactions among youngsters, or 
between youngsters and significant adults, sometimes preserving 
more-or-less "true life" situations, but more often setting up con-
trolled experimental situations and observing behavior within these. 
Reviewing the results of these experiments, we soon become aware 
that there are often no strong correlations among situations, or be-
tween experimental behavior and real life behavior, or between ex-
perimental behavior and various measures of traits or abilities. 
Furthermore, even the most carefully crafted laboratory experi-
ment, one which finds stable differences between males and females, 
may not find those at different ages, or given different conditions 
(such as the tasks given), or when conducted by different experi-
menters (there being, it now appears, a tendency for both men and 
women researchers to emerge with findings favorable to their own 
genders). 
Does this account exaggerate the complexities? If anything, it 
understates them. For example, the best current model of academic 
choice-itself only one part of the larger question of talent and its 
training-provides for eleven general categories of variables, most 
of these subdivided, making more than twenty that would have to 
be defined, measured reliably, with the interrelationships plotted. 
Even so, it omits several variables which would seem to be neces-
sary for an adequate picture. 
Even when we achieve a plausible map of the variables we need 
to know about, we meet another problem far more serious than is 
generally recognized: the instability of findings from study to study. 
Seemingly straightforward relationships tend to lead to murky find-
ings. It has been widely believed, for example, that mathematical 
302 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:295 
talent has a great deal to do with spatial skills, but the evidence on 
that rather narrow, focused question turns out to produce no strong 
findings. "Thus it appears that the relation between spatial skills 
and mathematical achievement is not yet fully understood." Need-
less to say, the uncertainties and confusions increase when we deal 
with more complex relationships. Even when we find what seems to 
be a clear set of correlations, it is not at all clear how we ought to 
construe the causal sequences. One example: most (though by no 
means all) studies show girls to be less confident of their math abili-
ties, take fewer advanced courses in math, do more poorly, and 
have lower expectations directed toward them by parents and teach-
ers. One plausible construction of these findings holds that the in-
difference to math achievement in girls (or the active 
discouragement of it) communicated by the culture through signifi-
cant adults is the primary source of lowered achievement and loss of 
interest. Yet one could turn that on its head without doing any 
violence to the facts, arguing that girls on the threshold of adoles-
cence, watching boys suddenly move ahead of them in math 
achievement, lose interest and put their energies elsewhere. I 
should say that I find the first construction somewhat more plausi-
ble than the second, but then again when we look closely at the 
findings in this area, we find that there are many plausibilities which 
turn out not to be true. One would certainly believe that there is an 
association between the amount of math done by parents and their 
children's atttitudes toward math, and plans to enroll in courses; 
but there is not. Throughout the literature on this topic, we find the 
belief that parents and teachers expect less from girls in math; in 
fact, the better studies are unable to confirm that nearly universal 
expectation. 
Another confounding element has to do with historical 
changes. When we deal with such variables as values, sex roles, 
socialization patterns, economic incentives, careers, and so on, we 
are dealing with matters which are highly vulnerable to changes, 
both real and symbolic, in the culture at large. Almost all of the 
literature I have surveyed on parental expectations for their chil-
dren's schooling is over a decade old, and it is hard to believe that 
attitudes have not changed in that period of time, especially given 
the continuing increase of women in the work force. 
Let us pause here to review what we know about sex differ-
ences and math ability. It amounts to very little. Boys and girls do 
not differ much until early adolescence, and even then the gap be-
tween them is not at all substantial, although the number of genuine 
prodigies is vastly disproportionate between boys and girls. We do 
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not know why this is so, nor why pubescence is the apparent turn-
ing point. A biological explanation would seem to account parsi-
moniously for what is known, (it is my own preference, by the way) 
but so would an entirely environmental explanation. 
Once we get past these plain facts we find ourselves awash in 
findings, which add up to very little when examined closely. Does a 
child like math because he is good at it, or vice versa? Do math 
teachers pay more attention to boys because they are boys, or be-
cause they are better in math, or because they are believed to be 
better in math, or believed to be better when paid attention to? 
Here, as elsewhere, the findings we have can be read variously. 
They do not compel any specific model of how mathematical talent 
is evoked, or enhanced, or directed. An existing model is imposed 
upon the evidence, guides the interpretation of what is found, and 
directs the search for relationships as well as the search for new 
findings. Hence, research tends toward the confirmation of existing 
belief, and although the controls of science are meant to minimize 
that tendency, they do so only over the long run, and never easily or 
perfectly. Given strong beliefs and frail evidence, there is all the 
more temptation to employ a coercive model to order the evidence 
and to formulate its meanings. 
With respect to mathematical talent, the common belief has it 
that sex differences are a function of differential (and invidious) 
processes of socialization, initiated in the family, reinforced by later 
agents, such as the schools, the intent of which is to inhibit expecta-
tions, and aspiration, and ultimately performance in areas deemed 
to be "masculine" such as mathematics and science. If the sociali-
zation processes against math achievement in girls are so powerful, 
why do they not work in childhood, when presumably there is a 
greater malleability to adult pressure? Why are the data on paren-
tal pressures so weak and uneven? To return to the original Stan-
ley-Benbow question, why are there such huge differences in talent 
at the top, and not elsewhere? If there is indeed a conspiracy to 
draw boys toward mathematics and girls away, what is the point of 
it? Presumably to keep women "powerless." If that is the case, 
why are they "permitted" to be better than men in verbal perform-
ance? It is the lawyers and memo-writers who rule the world-ask 
any engineer. 
It is discouraging to reflect that after so much work, we end up 
knowing little more than we would from common sense alone. 
Here, for example, is one of the conclusions of the most thorough 
review of this literature we now have: "Thus, if a girl likes math 
but feels that the amount of effort it will take to do well is not 
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worthwhile because it decreases the time she will have available for 
more preferred activities . . . she will be less likely to continue tak-
ing math. Similarly, if a girl sex-types mathematics . . . as mascu-
line and not in line with her own sex values, she will be less likely 
. . . to continue her mathematical studies, especially if she does not 
expect to do well." 
Of course we know that already. Furthermore, there is noth-
ing at all sex-specific about that conclusion, since it also might ap-
ply to boys. Boys who like math but feel that the effort to do well is 
not worth the time, if it cuts into, say, football practice, will tend 
not to take math courses. And boys who consider academic study 
to be unmanly, will be less likely to put any effort into school work, 
especially so if they do not expect to do well. 
The authors go on to argue that what counts is not so much 
reality as the youngster's perception of reality-an arguable propo-
sition-hence, adults ought to "become more sensitive to their own 
attitudes toward mathematics and avoid perpetuating stereotypic 
views of math achievement and [quantitative] careers ... as inap-
propriate for girls and women." Yet if we look more closely at that 
very modest bit of advice, we see that it embodies an idea of human 
action itself quite arguable, to wit, that youngsters choosing a career 
are easily dissuaded from doing what they truly want to do, thus 
easily persuaded to do otherwise by enlightened adults. Why not 
assume instead that youngsters, both boys and girls, are on the 
whole rational consumers of careers, choosing through a calculus 
made up of opportunities, incentives, values, and talent? Why as-
sume only benighted teachers and parents determined to grind 
down the young? We have, after all, seen during the past two de-
cades some remarkable changes in the rise and fall, or fall and rise, 
of gender distribution in a number of occupations, especially such 
elite vocations as law and medicine. These changes took place be-
cause of other changes--economic, demographic, and legal-which 
in tum produced still other changes, in opportunities and incen-
tives. Yet much of the research treats the labor market and other 
realities almost as epiphenomena, certainly as secondary, giving its 
full credence to the idea that society is no more than a vast, coer-
cive, relentless, and evil machine for the perpetuation of sexism, so 
powerful that it must be countered by a vast and continuing propa-
ganda campaign. That image of the American social order lies be-
hind most of the research on gender and talent-inspiring the 
questions it deems important to ask, the answers it expects to find, 
and the interpretations it imposes on findings which, as we have 
seen, are invariably weak or equivocal. 
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Even so, the problems in literature on mathematical achieve-
ments are indeed minor when weighed against what we have in 
most other areas. What do we have where the variable is intrinsi-
cally complex or ambiguous, or difficult to define and assess? A 
good example is the current state of thought on the question of sex 
differences in morality. To begin with there are a large number of 
disputes about what "morality" really is-whether it is behavior, or 
sentiment, or quality of thought. Beyond that, there are vastly com-
plicated questions of how to approach each of these elements con-
ceptually and empirically. The specific question most recent 
research has concentrated upon is whether men or women have 
"higher" or "lower" levels of moral thinking. Depending on the 
instruments employed, one can demonstrate (a) that one sex or the 
other is higher or lower; (b) that there are no sex differences; (c) 
that there are differences, but only in quality or direction, not in 
degree; or (d) that there are qualitative differences which prove that 
either one sex or the other has a higher or lower level of moral 
maturity. The reader unwilling to believe this account of the state 
of the research is advised to study a recent issue of the scholarly 
journal Social Research, devoted entirely to the question of women 
and morality, containing a dozen or so contributions, all of them 
focusing on essentially the same body of information, yet differing 
so remarkably in approach and interpretation that the reader soon 
imagines he has come upon a Tower of Babel. 
The serious reader, trying to keep up with what is going on in 
the social sciences, must rely upon the better newspapers, the 
weekly news magazines, or those publications devoted to reporting 
science for a general audience. So he will pick up the New York 
Times or Newsweek, or Psychology Today, or Discover, and therein 
learn about the breakthroughs, the recent findings, the new perspec-
tives. The accounts given will likely be accurate, yet quite as likely 
misleading, in that they rarely capture the provisional, tentative, 
often ephemeral nature of the work reported. If you were to see the 
same studies discussed in a technical journal-let us say, the Psy-
chological Bulletin-you would probably learn that for every find-
ing in one direction, one can discover another in the opposite 
direction; or that earlier work has not been repeated, or is repeated 
only under very special conditions; or that an entire genre of re-
search has proved to be false because of newly discovered method-
ological errors. And it is important to bear in mind that the 
"discrediting" of earlier work is by no means an occasional event; 
far more often than not, the secular trend is for prior work to prove 
insubstantial or incomplete. 
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In short, secure knowledge is extremely difficult to achieve in 
the social sciences. Minor variations in procedure can produce ma-
jor variations in outcome. When findings accumulate in a domain, 
they are often such a mixture of yeas and nays and maybes that the 
scholar must order data through an interpretation others may find 
false or idiosyncratic. When findings are unclear or uninteresting, 
or when they conflict with current belief, the investigator will be too 
disheartened to write them up, or the journals will be unwilling to 
publish them. That is not conjecture: studies in several areas con-
firm that research which disconfirms the conventional wisdom of 
the field is less likely to find its way into print. 
These are the ordinary hazards of doing and using social sci-
ence. They can be overcome, but only in the long run, when there 
has been a considerable accumulation of work; we have in fact seen 
that take place in such areas as psychotherapy and education, but 
only when we have had hundreds of studies on a limited range of 
issues. That is not yet the case with respect to sex differences, 
where the quotidian difficulties of research are compounded by the 
strong ideological interests at work. On these topics, the prudent 
citizen ought not to believe what he reads, not fully, and those re-
sponsible for public policy should keep themselves fanatically skep-
tical when instructed on the latest lessons from social science. 
